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Emergency Exemptions from
Environmental Laws After Disasters
Michael B. Gerrard

M

any environmental statutes had their origins
in disasters. And when disasters strike, the
environmental laws come into play in the
response. Some have urged Congress to
adopt emergency exemptions so that the environmental
laws do not interfere with rescue and recovery.
This article explains how disasters helped create our
current statutes, and then describes the role that environmental laws played in the immediate response to the
September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina. It catalogs the
multiple exemptions that already exist in the current environmental statutes and regulations and then summarizes the
exemptions that were proposed after Hurricane Katrina.
Legislation has addressed risks in the transport and use of
hazardous chemicals since the mid-1800s, when the railroads were transporting explosives and flammable materials
such as nitroglycerin. The Explosives and Combustibles
Act of 1908 gave the Interstate Commerce Commission
jurisdiction over these issues. This statute gradually evolved
over the years, but the evolution was punctuated by reactions to terrible accidents. Later on, the 1967 Torrey
Canyon oil tanker spill and the 1968 Santa Barbara
Channel oil spill helped lead to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, which required the newly created
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate a
National Oil and Hazardous Materials Contingency Plan
(NCP). The 1973 crash at Logan International Airport in
Boston of a cargo jet loaded with hazardous materials highlighted the fragmentation of regulatory authorities and led
to enactment of the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act of 1975. Worker exposure to the chemical Kepone at a
factory in Virginia in 1975, with ensuing health damage,
helped lead to two 1976 enactments, the Toxic Substances
Control Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. The Love Canal incident in Niagara Falls in 1978
inspired the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),
which expanded the mission of the NCP to include the
cleanup of hazardous substance sites.
Most terribly, the release of methyl isocyanate at a Union
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984, killing several thousand people, shortly followed by a frightening but nonlethal
release in Institute, West Virginia, led to the Emergency
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Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA), requiring state and local emergency planning and
the compilation and public disclosure of extensive information about chemical use. The Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska in
1989 led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Also enacted in
1990 were the Clean Air Act Amendments, which included
Section 112(r), requiring chemical plants to develop risk
management plans and to specify worst-case scenarios.

September 11
By the day the planes hit the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, an elaborate system of exemptions from the environmental laws was in place, and it was
fully utilized.
In the hours after the buildings collapsed, a massive rescue effort was launched in search of anyone who might
have survived. Large quantities of construction equipment
were brought in to lift the crumbled steel and shattered
concrete, and fleets of trucks and barges hauled the material to the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island, where officials searched for human remains and for forensic evidence. The landfill had been scheduled to close by
December 31, 2001, by operation of a state law enacted in
1996 and accompanying consent decrees, and in fact it
had stopped accepting waste in March 2001. The closure
was brought on by the landfill’s negative environmental
effects and not by a lack of physical capacity. It suddenly
reopened with little or no legal formality to accommodate
WTC debris. The total quantity of WTC material
brought to Fresh Kills—more than 1 million tons—was
more than the amount of construction and demolition
(C&D) debris that all municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills in New York State accept in a year.
The debris that went to Fresh Kills included material
that ordinarily could not lawfully be disposed at a C&D or
MSW landfill, and would need to go to facilities specially
designed for hazardous, asbestos, or petroleum wastes. The
task of separating the material would have been extremely
laborious, and would have slowed down the disposal operation, and exposed the workers to further hazards.
In theory, many of these demolition, transport, and disposal operations may have violated environmental laws.
Environmental impact review, advance notice of asbestos
removal, source separation, and many other procedures
would ordinarily be required for a large demolition project.
None of these legal procedures were followed, and no one
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said a thing. No environmental agency or advocacy group
would dare try to interfere with the rescue effort. In short,
the environmental laws worked as they should have under
such extreme circumstances—they got out of the way.
A New York State statute provides that
[s]ubject to the state constitution, the federal constitution
and federal statutes and regulations . . . the governor may by
executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any
statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or
parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency,
if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or
delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.

Governor George Pataki used this law on September 12 to
suspend many statutes of limitations, and on October 9 he
used it to suspend certain regulations regarding transportation and handling of solid wastes, so as to facilitate the
WTC removal operation.
The regulations under the State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA) exempt from the environmental
impact statement (EIS) requirement “emergency actions that
are immediately necessary on a limited and temporary basis
for the protection or preservation of life, health, property or
natural resources, provided that such actions are directly
related to the emergency and are performed to cause the least
change or disturbance, practicable under the circumstances,
to the environment.” 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(c)(33). The
courts have interpreted this provision broadly to encompass
events that at first glance do not look much like emergencies
(such as prison overcrowding and homelessness), but obviously the response to the WTC disaster fit squarely within
this definition. Emergency provisions were invoked to allow
solid waste transfer stations to handle the large quantities of
garbage that backed up when much transportation in the city
ground to a halt, and to expedite dredging (long delayed by
fear of contaminated sediments) to create new berths in
Manhattan and Brooklyn to accommodate the barges that
took away some of the debris.
At the federal level, certain exemptions were triggered by
the declaration of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) on September 11 that New York City was
a disaster area. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, the federal emergency
response is largely exempt from the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), SEQRA’s federal counterpart.
Congress granted an extension from compliance with
certain transportation conformity requirements of the
Clean Air Act, largely because the metropolitan planning
organization in charge of this planning process was housed
at the World Trade Center; its files and work papers were
destroyed and several of its employees were killed.
Within a few days after the attacks it became clear that
there were no remaining survivors, and the rescue operation ended. The removal of the smoldering debris, and
the human remains within, then continued without delays
caused by environmental permitting requirements.

The first building to be reconstructed at the site was 7
World Trade Center, situated north of the twin towers; it collapsed on the afternoon of September 11, but it had been
completely evacuated and there was no loss of life there. Its
replacement was designed to be thinner and taller, so that a
street that had been cut off by the original construction could
be reopened. An environmental assessment was prepared
under SEQRA, with a state agency, the Empire State
Development Corporation (ESDC), acting as lead agency. It
became clear, however, that the SEQRA process was about to
delay the start of construction by a few months. This was a
serious matter, because 7 World Trade Center had been built
atop a Consolidated Edison Co. electrical substation that provided electricity to much of Lower Manhattan. Until that
substation could be rebuilt, electricity service was provided
through a jerry-rigged system of cables running on the surface
of the streets. This was an intrinsically unstable situation.
Thus ESDC invoked SEQRA’s emergency provision and
allowed site preparation activities to go forward before the
completion of the SEQRA process. Ultimately ESDC decided that no EIS was necessary, as the new 7 WTC, though
taller than the original, had less square footage and therefore
it generated less traffic and sewage, used less water and energy,
and otherwise had fewer impacts. Thus SEQRA did not
delay the reconstruction of 7 World Trade Center.
No emergency was declared for the replacement of the
office space in the twin towers and of the nearby roadways, commuter railway terminal and subway stations, and
the construction of a memorial to the victims of the
attacks. Four full EISs were prepared covering all this
work. They were processed under a combination of
SEQRA and NEPA, since federal financial assistance was
involved. The reconstruction has endured a series of
delays, but none caused by the SEQRA and NEPA
processes. Instead, disputes over the design, financing,
and security measures caused these delays. The formal
environmental review process (in which the author participated as environmental counsel to the holder of the
ground lease to the World Trade Center site, Silverstein
Properties) provided an important forum for the systematic examination of the many environmental issues that
arose in the design of the project.
Many environmental controversies have surrounded
the recovery and reconstruction efforts at the World Trade
Center site. The most contentious probably concern
whether EPA gave full information to nearby residents
and to recovery workers about the nature of lingering air
pollution. Several cases on this issue are still being litigated. However, none of this has seriously delayed the
reconstruction efforts.

Hurricane Katrina
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept across
coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi. The levees protecting New Orleans broke, leaving much of the city
flooded. More than 1,400 died.
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Even before landfall, Governor Kathleen Blanco of
underground storage tanks; and numerous inspection,
Louisiana and Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi both
monitoring, and discharge reporting requirements.
declared that a state of emergency existed. On the day
Thousands of buildings have to be demolished because
the hurricane hit, FEMA declared both states to be disasthe water has rendered them uninhabitable, and often
ter areas. A flurry of emergency orders ensued, exempting
structurally unstable. Ordinarily such demolition must be
various operations from the standard environmental
preceded by an asbestos inspection and, if asbestos is
requirements.
found, advance notice to EPA and special removal proceAs soon as the storm left, there was an immediate need
dures. This would have greatly impeded the work, and in
to drain the floodwaters. The fastest way was pumping
many cases would have exposed demolition workers to
the water and discharging it into Lake Pontchartrain.
unsafe conditions. Thus this requirement was enforced
That ordinarily would have required a National Pollutant
flexibly (though not as flexibly as some Louisiana officials
Discharge Elimination System permit under the Clean
would have liked). Efforts were made to remove household
Water Act. However, Section 311(c) of the Clean Water
appliances that contained freon and other ozone-depleting
Act authorizes the President to “ensure immediate and
compounds and recover these gases, but this requirement
effective removal” of discharges from onshore facilities of
too was bypassed when the work would have been hazoil and hazardous substances that pose substantial threats
ardous to workers. Demolition was delayed by a lawsuit
to public health or welfare. EPA determined that exempagainst the City of New Orleans over the adequacy of
tion applied, since there were numernotification to residents of demolious industrial facilities, sewer systems,
tion, but this was not brought under
and oil and hazardous substance disthe environmental laws.
charges in the flooded areas.
Immense quantities of debris from
It appears that the
Much of the immediate recovery
the hurricanes have to be removed—
work also involved depositing materitwo orders of magnitude more than
emergency response
als in wetlands. That ordinarily
that involved at the WTC site.
requires a permit under Section 404
Many financial, manpower, political
of the Clean Water Act. The Corps
and bureaucratic hurdles have
to Hurricanes Katrina and
of Engineers invoked emergency prodelayed this removal. Environmental
cedures to waive or modify the perrules are among the factors involved.
Rita—like that to the
mitting requirements for emergency
The environmental regulations
response work.
were also enforced flexibly in allow9/11 attacks—was not
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane
ing some businesses that had been
Rita, which followed less than a
shut down by the floodwaters to
month later, disrupted the major oil
reopen. Many facilities needed emerinhibited by the
and gas production and refining
gency power generators, new water
industries on the Gulf Coast. Thus,
supply wells, sewage treatment varienvironmental laws.
various kinds of fuels and fuel addiances, and other items that would
tives could not be produced in the
ordinarily take many months, but
needed quantities. EPA granted four
that were greatly expedited after the
kinds of waivers from Clean Air Act
hurricanes.
requirements. It waived the volatility requirements that
All in all, it appears that the emergency response to
apply to gasoline sold during the summer driving season; it
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—like that to the 9/11
waived the requirement that diesel fuel sold for use in onattacks—was not inhibited by the environmental laws.
road vehicles contain no more than 500 parts per million
Exemptions or waivers were granted, or the authorities
of sulfur; it waived the requirement that certain cities use
simply looked the other way.
reformulated gasoline; and it waived certain low-sulfur
As with 9/11 as well, reconstruction of the areas devasgasoline requirements that apply to the Atlanta area.
tated by the hurricanes has faced numerous challenges—
Additionally, EPA used its enforcement discretion and
engineering, financial, economic, political, legal, and
issued “no action assurances” to allow certain actions that
emotional. Indeed, the area destroyed by the hurricanes is
would otherwise violate the Clean Air Act. This includfar larger, and the challenges are far more complex, than
ed, for example, rules regarding vapor recovery at gasoline
those involved after 9/11. NEPA will apply to much of
pumps, and certification rules for tank truck carriers.
the work. Neither Louisiana nor Mississippi has a “little
Similarly the states issued many waivers. The
NEPA” law like New York’s SEQRA (though Louisiana
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, for
has other mechanisms for requiring similar kinds of enviexample, granted relief from the rules applicable to wasteronmental review). To date it does not appear that NEPA
water discharges; air emissions relating to repair activities
or other environmental laws have stood in the way of
and temporary power sources; on-site solid and hazardous
reconstruction, except for some delays in demolition due
waste management; inspection and rehabilitation of
to EPA’s enforcement of the asbestos rules.
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The decisions about just how to rebuild, and in what
sequence and at what pace, remain ahead. The shape of
the environmental review process to be followed has also
not been determined. However, it is clear that the magnitude of the disaster had been greatly increased by a long
history of poor environmental decisions with respect to
flood protection, destruction of coastal wetlands, and
other items. Thus making new decisions without due
regard of the serious environmental issues involved would
mean that little had been learned from the catastrophe.

Exemptions in Place
The emergency exemptions in environmental law fall
into two broad categories—the generic and the case-specific. The generic exemptions, in turn, come in four
types: exemptions from permitting requirements; relaxation of substantive standards; exemptions from, or acceleration of, certain processes; and releases from liability.
The case-specific exemptions are aimed at specific projects
or geographic areas. Examples included congressional declarations of nonnavigability that shield certain areas from
Corps of Engineers permitting requirements, and congressional and state legislative declarations that certain projects need not go through the standard environmental
review process.
Few of these exemptions are self-executing. Most
require a declaration or finding of the administrator of
EPA (either acting on her own authority, or under a delegation from the President) or of another high federal official. In the absence of such a federal action, regulated
entities generally cannot simply plead that the environmental laws do not apply to them. A notable exception is
the act of God or war defense that is found in most of the
federal statutes that confer environmental liability.
Before listing the statutes that are aimed at specific environmental conditions, three overarching laws should be
mentioned. NEPA is a procedural overlay applicable to
most federal actions of environmental significance. The text
of NEPA contains no emergency exemptions. However, the
implementing regulations of the Council on Environmental
Quality authorize lead agencies to make “alternative
arrangements” in emergency situations. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11.
For disasters and other emergencies abroad, Executive Order
12,114 provides (in Section 2-5) for exemptions from environmental review requirements for relief action.
The National Historic Preservation Act applies to a
broad array of federal actions. It provides for disaster
waivers from some of its requirements, 16 U.S.C. § 470h2(j). The regulations of the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation also provide for emergency procedures. 36
C.F.R. §§ 78, 800.12.
The third overarching statute is the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. In addition to giving many powers to FEMA, it provides a NEPA
exemption for immediate response actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5159, 44 C.F.R. § 10.8. It also gives the President the

authority to clear debris and wreckage resulting from
major disasters. 42 U.S.C. § 5173(a).
Most of the substantive environmental laws and their
implementing regulations contain emergency exemptions
of various sorts.
The Clean Air Act has at least nine, most of which, as
noted above, were invoked after Hurricane Katrina. The
available waivers include:
• from emission restrictions for fuel burning stationary
sources during national or regional energy emergencies, 42
U.S.C. § 7410(f);
• from national emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants from stationary sources when in the interests of
national security, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(4);
• from fuel additive requirements during emergencies,
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C);
• from transportation conformity requirements during
emergencies or natural disasters, 40 C.F.R. § 51.853;
• for federal emission sources where “in the paramount
interest of the United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 7418;
• from certain of the requirements under the National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for the
demolition of asbestos-containing buildings, when the
building has been ordered torn down because it “is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse,” 40
C.F.R. § 61.145(a)(3);
• for Defense Department vehicles due to national
security, 42 U.S.C. § 7588(e);
• for federal procurement when in the paramount
national interest, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(d); and
• from chlorofluorocarbon Class 1 phase-out to protect
national security interests, 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(f).
The Clean Water Act and its regulations have at least
six exemptions. These are:
• act of God or war, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12);
• during upset (“an exceptional incident in which
there is unintentional and temporary noncompliance with
technology based permit effluent limitations because of
factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee”),
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(1);
• emergencies that require expedited procedures for
the processing of permit applications by the Corps of
Engineers, 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(e)(4);
• emergencies requiring expedited direct action by the
Corps, 33 C.F.R. § 337.7; and
• exigent discharges of oil and hazardous substances,
33 U.S.C. § 1321(c), 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(d).
CERCLA also has an act of God or war defense. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1). Additionally, it allows:
• emergency removal actions, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), 40
C.F.R. § 300.440;
• relaxation of remedial standards if compliance
“would result in greater risk to human health,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(4); and
• exemptions for Department of Energy and
Department of Defense facilities based on national security, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j).
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The Coastal Zone Management Act allows the
President to authorize federal actions that are inconsistent
with state coastal plans if the President finds it is in the
paramount interest of the country, or the Secretary of
Commerce determines it is a matter of national security.
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
The Endangered Species Act allows otherwise prohibited “takes” of protected species in federal disaster areas, 16
U.S.C. § 1533, and streamlines or waives consultation for
repair or replacement of public facilities in such areas, 16
U.S.C. § 1536.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act allows EPA to exempt federal and state agencies from
any requirement of the statute if EPA determines that
emergency conditions exist that require such exemption. 7
U.S.C. § 136p, 40 C.F.R. § 166.2.
The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act,
also known as the Ocean Dumping Act, allows emergency
dumping of industrial wastes when EPA has found an
emergency requires it. 33 U.S.C. § 1412a. It also allows
vessels to scuttle cargo and waste during emergencies. 40
C.F.R. § 220.
The Oil Pollution Act has an act of God or war
defense. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
The Noise Control Act allows exemptions for reasons
of national security, 42 U.S.C. § 4909(b)(1).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allows
the President to determine it to be in the “paramount
interest” of the nation to exempt any federal solid waste
management facility. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). This authority also extends to federal underground storage tanks. 42
U.S.C. § 6991f(a). EPA may issue temporary emergency
permits to allow treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous wastes where there is imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment. 40
C.F.R. § 270.61(a). The standards applicable to treatment, storage, and disposal facilities may also give way in
time of emergency. 40 C.F.R. § 264.1(g)(8).
The Safe Drinking Water Act allows states to exempt
public water supply systems from maximum contaminant
levels due to “compelling factors,” including “urgent
threats to public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5.
The Toxic Substances Control Act allows EPA to go to
court for seizure of an imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture, or for relief against anyone who manufactures, processes, distributes, uses, or disposes of such
material. 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
The Wilderness Act allows road-building in wilderness
areas during emergencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).

Proposed Legislation
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
Congress passed and President Bush signed several emergency funding laws. These were not especially controversial, though there was some debate about the appropriate
amounts.

Considerable controversy, however, attended a number of bills that attempted to create additional exemptions from the environmental laws. For example, S.
1711, introduced on September 15, 2005, by Senator
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) would allow EPA, in consultation with the governor of the affected state, to waive or
modify for a period of 120 days the application of any
requirement that is contained in any statute or regulation that is administered by EPA, if the administrator
finds that such action is necessary to respond to
Hurricane Katrina, and makes a number of related
findings.
More narrowly targeted was S. 1709, the Gulf Coast
Water Infrastructure Emergency Assistance Act of 2005,
which dealt with the funding of drinking water projects.
Other bills, including S. 1765, introduced by Senator
Mary Landrieu (D-La.), and S. 1766, introduced by
Senator David Vitter (R-La.), both entitled the Louisiana
Katrina Reconstruction Act, would have allowed waivers
from environmental laws to facilitate reconstruction.
The House narrowly passed the Gasoline for America’s
Security Act, H.R. 3893, which would have waived
numerous Clean Air Act requirements.
As of the writing of this article, in March 2006, none
of these exemptions has been enacted into law. The
impetus for them appears to have dissipated as it has
become clear that, of all the serious impediments facing
response to the hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, environmental laws were very low on the list, and Congress has been
distracted by other priorities.
The American Bar Association’s Section of
Environment, Energy, and Resources submitted detailed
comments to EPA in November 2005 expressing reservations about expanded exemptions. The comments concluded “that the risks accompanying blanket exemptions
to environmental regulations should not be removed without individual consideration of the dangers at issue,” and
that “broad exemptions carry significant costs and risks as
well, which deserve individual and serious scrutiny before
action is taken to eliminate environmental protections.”
The Section opposed legislation that authorizes or creates
broad exemptions or waivers of federal or state environmental laws. The Section’s report included an extensive
analysis of the existing environmental exemptions. (The
listing contained in this article is drawn in part from that
report.)
Both the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina
led to horrific loss of life and considerable environmental
damage. Recovery from both has been, and continues
to be, a long and difficult process. However, thanks to
an ample supply of existing exemptions, the environmental laws have not been a major impediment to recovery,
and have actually assisted in the systematic assessment
of the best courses of action. This experience should
be borne in mind if future disasters lead to renewed
calls for further exemptions from the environmental
laws.
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